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Abstract
An advisor is supposed to recommend a nancial product in the best
interest of her client. However, the best product for the client may not always
be the product yielding the highest commission (paid by product providers)
to the advisor. Do advisors nevertheless provide truthful advice? If not, will
a voluntary or obligatory payment by a client induce more truthful advice?
According to the results, only the voluntary payment reduces the con
ict of
interest faced by advisors.
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Financial advisors are individuals who give advice concerning nancial products
to private persons and companies (clients). Financial products are, e.g., insurance
policies, stocks, bonds, mortgages, pensions. In exchange for their services, nancial
advisors receive either commissions or fees, or a combination of both. Commissions
are paid by product providers per nancial product sold to clients. Fees are paid by
clients per hour of consulting.
In some countries, like the U.S.A. and the U.K., all three ways of payment coexist.
In others, like the Scandinavian countries, commissions are forbidden. In Germany,
almost all advisors are paid commissions. For years, the incentives generated by
commissions have been a topic of lively debates in the German and the international
press.1 In light of the nancial crisis, concerns have become even more severe.
Critics point at the con
ict of interest that commissions create for advisors. If
dierently attractive commissions relate to dierent nancial products, advisors
have an incentive to recommend those products that yield the highest commissions
and not necessarily the products that are in the best interest of their clients. As a
consequence, clients may lose money. Inderst and Ottaviani (2010) investigate the
role of commissions in a theoretical model and show that commissions are indeed
used to steer the advisor's recommendations.
This situation is an example of a principal-agent problem arising because of asym-
metric information and a con
ict of interest (see, e.g., Holmstrom, 1979; Eisenhardt,
1A list of references to German newspaper articles can be found in the Appendix. Further
examples from the U.K. and the U.S.A. along with many references are given in Inderst and
Ottaviani (2010).
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cipal employs an agent who has to exert a certain eort in exchange for a salary.
The agent experiences disutility from work, and since the principal cannot aord to
monitor the agent or is not able to do so, the agent has an incentive to exert less
eort than agreed (moral hazard). Shirking reduces the productivity of the agent
as well as the prot of the principal.
In the context of the nancial market, a client (principal) looks for (hires) an advisor
(agent) and hopes to receive truthful advice2 (high eort). Since the client lacks
expertise on nancial matters, she is not able to judge the quality of advice given.
If the advisor's interest con
icts with that of the client, there is an incentive for the
advisor to exploit her by providing misleading advice. Although the advisor does
not suer the cost of eort when providing truthful advice, she forgoes prots. Of
course, the client can still decide whether to follow the advisor's recommendation
or not. Furthermore, knowing the best product for the client and recommending
something else may be viewed as immoral, similar to a lie.
Traditional remedies for the principal-agent problem are, for instance, incentive con-
tracts which align the interests of employers and employees. An alternative that has
attracted much attention is to address social preferences, in particular reciprocity,
which is an intrinsic concern of many individuals. Along these lines, Akerlof (1982);
Akerlof and Yellen (1988, 1990) state the fair-wage hypothesis, suggesting that gen-
erous wages (often above marginal product) that are perceived as fair will increase
2For reasons of parsimony, I will use the term \truthful advice" instead of \advice in the best
interest of the client" throughout this paper. Also, \recommendation" and \advice" will be used
interchangeably. The term \truthful advice" is warranted in the context of my experiment: due to
the xed wording of the recommendation, the advisor can give only one type of recommendation
which is truthful while the others are misleading.
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in favor of this view shows that principals prefer to oer wages above competitive
levels especially when agents have discretion over their eort because higher wages
lead to supply of more costly eort (see, e.g., Fehr et al., 1993, 1998; Fehr and Falk,
1999).
This study proposes a new remuneration mode for advisors which addresses the fact
that many individuals are reciprocators. The eectiveness of this mode in reducing
the con
ict of interest faced by advisors is tested experimentally and compared
to two existing modes { commissions only and commissions complemented with a
fee (hereafter obligatory payment). The proposed remuneration mode consists of
commissions complemented with a voluntary payment by clients. The introduction
of a voluntary payment is motivated by the following idea:
\And in both, traditional and modern societies, gift giving is likely to be part of an
exchange process. The motive may be more to create an obligation than to improve
the welfare of the recipient."(Axelrod, 1984, p.135)
In this sense, the voluntary payment by the client is expected to create an obligation
for the advisor to reciprocate with truthful advice.
The design of the experiment relies on a sender-receiver game3 similar to Gneezy
(2005). An advisor has private information about the monetary outcomes related
to three dierent options, each specifying a payo for the advisor and the client.
Payos are such that interests of clients and advisors are misaligned. The advisor
has to recommend one of the options to a client who is completely ignorant about
3The sender-receiver game is only used as a workhorse here. For more details on strategic
information transmission, see Crawford and Sobel (1982).
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nal payos for both. Before the advisor decides on her recommendation, depending
on the treatment, the client may either be required to provide a payment for advice
or oer a voluntary payment. Again, depending on the treatment, the payment may
either be low or high. The experimental design allows to test the hypothesis that an
additional payment will lead to more truthful advice. By imposing one-shot anony-
mous interaction, it excludes factors like reputation concerns which may in
uence
behavior in favor of the hypothesis under test. In the same way, punishments for
misleading recommendations are not possible in order to eliminate strategic incen-
tives to provide truthful advice.4
The similarities between the experimental design and the situation at the nancial
market are easily recognizable. The three options represent three distinct nancial
products, e.g. insurances. The payos of the advisor stand for the commissions
oered by nancial institutions per insurance sold. The payos of the client repre-
sent the utility for the client from each insurance. In the realistic situation, most
clients will not know the true alignment of interests and the commissions advisors
receive, nor their own payo from each insurance. Clients are unable to gather in-
formation about the dierent options due to time and/or educational constraints.
The obligatory payment is simply the fee that clients pay per hour of consulting.
The voluntary payment is a moral obligation disguised as money, a signal of good
will and trust, and a kind gesture calling for reciprocation in terms of a truthful
recommendation.5
4S anches-Pag es and Vorsatz (2007) and S anches-Pag es and Vorsatz (2009) examine the impact
of sanctions on truth-telling in a sender-receiver game.
5One could also argue that the voluntary payment will increase the second order belief of
advisors and therefore lead to more truthful advice. If advisors believe that clients believe that
advisors will provide more truthful advice, given the client paid voluntarily, then advisors may feel
4
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of truthful advice for several reasons. First, it may crowd out advisor's intrinsic
motivation to provide truthful advice (Frey and Jegen, 2000). Second, it may be
perceived as an unkind gesture aimed at increasing the payo of the client at the
expense of the advisor. Reciprocity in this case means to respond to unkindness with
unkindness (see Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004). Third and last,
advisors may act strategically: if they believe that clients, having paid for advice,
are more likely to follow it, they may provide truthful recommendations less often
in the presence of payment.
The specic research questions are as follows. Do commissions create a moral haz-
ard problem for advisors? If so, will an additional payment by clients (voluntary
or obligatory) solve the problem? Will a voluntary payment be equally or more
successful than an obligatory payment in inducing advisors to provide truthful rec-
ommendations? Will clients trust advisors and therefore follow recommendations
more frequently, having oered a voluntary payment as opposed to an obligatory
payment or no payment at all?
According to the results, only the voluntary payment reduces the con
ict of interest
of advisors. Advisors expect their truthful advice to be implemented so that there
is no strategic aspect in their behavior. Clients having paid for advice voluntarily,
follow it in 100% of the cases, and they also expect more truthful advice in the
presence of a voluntary payment rather than an obligatory payment or no payment
at all.
The novelty of this study is that it investigates the problem of moral hazard on the
guilt, if they do not live up to the client's expectations. To avoid guilt, advisors will try not to
disappoint the client (see Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006).
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been explored yet, at least experimentally. In a controlled laboratory environment,
I study the behavior of agents under the prevailing payment mechanisms and com-
pare it to an alternative to check whether market failure occurs, and if so, whether
and how it can best be fought. This work may be seen as a rst step toward pol-
icy recommendations for improving the organization of the market for professional
consulting.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design,
procedures, and behavioral predictions. Section 3 talks the reader through the
results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Experiment
2.1 Design
A cheap talk sender-receiver game was used as a workhorse. Subjects were randomly
matched in pairs for an anonymous, one-shot interaction. In the instructions, one
subject was assigned the role of \advisor" and the other of \decision maker" (here-
after client). The advisor faced three options, A, B, and C. Each option listed a
monetary payo for the advisor and a monetary payo for the client. Payos were
such that the best option for the client was not at the same time the best option for
the advisor (see Table 1).
The Pareto{dominated option C was added to limit strategic behavior by advisors
(as in Rode, 2010) and to increase the external validity of the experiment. When
6
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 for client
A 10 euros 5 euros
B 5 euros 10 euros
C 3 euros 3 euros
Table 1: Information for advisors: payo distribution for the two subjects
only two options are available, some advisors provide truthful advice, believing that
their client will invert it, i.e. select the other, not recommended option. Sutter
(2009) observed this behavior and labeled it \deception through telling the truth."
More options increase the external validity since, in reality, there are more than three
dierent funds, stocks, insurances which advisors can recommend to their clients,
and inverting is therefore not possible.
The client only knew that there were three options available. She neither knew the
payos related to each option nor whether the interests of subjects were aligned.
The task of the advisor was to recommend one of the three options to the client.
There were three possible recommendations, each stating one of the three options
as the most protable for the client. For example, recommendation 1 read: \Option
A will earn you more money than the other two options." Instead of showing the
recommended option to the client, she was asked whether she wanted to follow the
recommendation. If the answer was yes, the recommended option was implemented
as her decision. If it was no, one of the other two options was randomly selected
to be implemented as her decision. In the end, the client received feedback only
about her own payo from the chosen option. She never learned her payos of the
other two not selected options. Moreover, she never learned the potential and actual
payos of her advisor.
The experiment consisted of four dierent treatments summarized in Table 2. The
7
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between treatments will be worked out.
Treatment Abbrev. Subjects Sessions
Obligatory payment, 1 euro O1 64 2
Obligatory payment, 2 euros O2 64 2
Voluntary payment, 1 euro V1 62 2
Voluntary payment, 2 euros V2 64 2
Table 2: Treatments
First, consider treatments \Obligatory." Both client and advisor were told that with
an equal probability, advice would either be free of charge or available at a cost.
Depending on the treatment, the cost was either one or two euros. Prior to their
decisions neither the advisor nor the client were informed about the realization of the
random move determining whether advice would be costly or not. The advisor was
asked to provide two recommendations, one for each realization (strategy method,
Selten, 1967). Likewise, the client was asked to state whether she would follow
the recommendation for each realization. At the end of the experiment, everyone
received feedback about their own payo and whether advice was costly. The advisor
was additionally informed whether the client followed her advice.
In treatments \Voluntary," the client could oer a voluntary payment for advice be-
fore the advisor provided her recommendation. Again, depending on the treatment,
the payment amounted to one or two euros. It was common knowledge that the
advisor was obliged to advise in any case, even if not oered a payment. At this
point, the advisor was not informed whether she had been oered a payment. Like
in the O{treatments, she provided a recommendation both for the case of payment
and no payment. The client received only the recommendation that corresponded to
her actual decision to oer a payment or not. Feedback at the end of the experiment
8
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After the decision task, subjects were asked to state their belief about the behavior
of subjects in the other role and the same session. Each subject stated two beliefs:
one for the case in which a payment was made (voluntary or obligatory) and one for
the case, in which no payment was made. Clients guessed the share of advisors who
advise in the best interest of clients. Advisors guessed the share of clients who follow
the recommendation. In the V{treatments advisors also judged the share of clients
who oer a payment. Beliefs were incentivized in the following way. One guess
was randomly selected. If the guess was within 5% points of the realization, the
participant received one euro (as in Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006).6 Since asking
for beliefs may in
uence behavior, beliefs were mentioned after decisions were made
and before feedback on nal payos was given. The instructions only stated that
there would be an additional opportunity to earn money later on and that detailed
information would be provided on the computer screens. The sequence of events in
all treatments is summarized in Table 3.
In order to prevent advisors from mentally changing the original payo matrix by
adding the payment for advice to each payo of the advisor and subtracting it from
each payo of the client, the instructions stated explicitly that the payment would
be subtracted from the show-up fee of the client and added to the show-up fee of
the advisor. Both show-up fees were 2.5 euros.7
6As pointed out by Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), the procedure excludes rational responses
below 5% and above 95%. Nevertheless, I chose to use this incentive mechanism because of its
simplicity, especially compared to the widely used quadratic scoring rule. (For an interesting
discussion of the quadratic scoring rule, see Artinger et al. (2010).)
7I ran two pilot sessions of the V2 treatment, in which subjects interacted for ve rounds in
a complete stranger design. My intention was to check whether feedback and/or experience with
playing the game would change behavior. V2 was conducted in two dierent conditions: once
with full feedback for advisors (i.e. advisors were told after each round whether the client had
9
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Chance determines whether CL has to pay for advice (P) or not (NP).
Neither AD nor CL are informed whether the outcome of the chance move is P or NP.
AD gives advice for P and NP. (2 decisions)
CL decides whether to follow advice for P and NP. (2 decisions)
AD states beliefs about advice implementation and CL about quality of advice for P and NP.
Everyone learns the outcome of the chance move and their own payo.
Voluntary
CL decides whether to oer a payment (P) or not (NP). (1 decision)
AD is not informed about the decision of CL.
AD gives advice for both P and NP. (2 decisions)
CL decides whether to follow advice. (1 decision).
AD states beliefs about advice implementation and CL about quality of advice for P and NP.
Everyone learns their own payo. AD learns whether she was oered a payment.
Table 3: Course of events
Note: AD = Advisor, CL = Client, P = Payment, NP = No payment
2.2 Procedures
I performed 2 sessions per treatment or 8 sessions altogether, yielding 64 observations
per treatment.8 I recruited 254 undergraduate students from the University of Jena
(30 or 32 per session) for this experiment using the online recruitment system for
economic experiments ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). An additional 60 subjects took
part in the pilot sessions. On average, they earned 8.9 euros and spent 40 minutes
(15 minutes of which on the instructive part) in the laboratory of the Max Planck
Institute of Economics in Jena, Germany. The main sessions took place in January
oered a payment and whether she had followed the recommendation) and with no feedback for
advisors. Advisors in the latter condition and clients in both conditions received feedback only
at the end of the experiment and only about the one randomly selected round relevant for their
payment. Subjects were asked to state their beliefs in each round after the decisions were made.
Since the results of these sessions did not give any indication that behavior changed over time, the
treatments of the main experiment were conducted as a one-shot game.
8In the last session of V1 only 30 subjects showed up. Consequently, in this treatment there
are 62 observations.
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Upon arrival in the laboratory, subjects were randomly assigned to a cubicle, where
they individually read the instructions.9 Then they participated in the computer-
ized10 experiment. During the experiment, eye contact was not possible. Although
participants saw each other at the entrance of the lab, there was no way for them
to guess who of the 32 students they would be matched with later on. All subjects
had participated in at least one experiment before.
2.3 Behavioral predictions
Recall that the aim of this study is to test the eect of an additional payment by
clients on the willingness of advisors to provide truthful advice. The additional pay-
ment will only be successful if it aligns the behavior of advisors with their beliefs
and the behavior and beliefs of clients. More specically, the payment will be found
eective in reducing advisors' con
ict of interest if
(i) advisors provide more truthful advice with payment than without payment;
(ii) clients follow advice more often with payment than without payment;
(iii) advisors believe that clients will follow advice more often with payment than
without payment;
(iv) clients believe that advisors will provide truthful advice more often with pay-
ment than without payment.
If for more than one type of payment all these conditions are met, then the frequency
of truthful advice with payment will be compared across treatments. This will allow
to determine the most eective mechanism(s) for reducing moral hazard on the
9For a translation of the instructions from the German, see Appendix.
10The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
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Why do I expect that any of the payments will induce more truthful advice?
Under standard assumptions, the recommendation of a selsh advisor will be chosen
strategically. If the advisor believes that the client, having paid for her recommen-
dation, is likely to follow it, the advisor will provide a recommendation in her own
interest. However, under the assumption that individuals hold social preferences for
fairness and reciprocity, these predictions will change.11
Outcomes-based fairness models (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ocken-
fels, 2000) predict that any payment (no matter whether obligatory or voluntary)
will induce higher frequencies of truthful advice. The reason given is that, in case
of payment, a truthful recommendation will decrease inequality of nal payos from
the experiment, while an untruthful recommendation will increase inequality. Hence,
if advisors are inequity averse and believe that clients, having paid for their recom-
mendation, are likely to follow it, then they will provide truthful advice in case of
payment.
According to intentions-based fairness models (see, e.g., Rabin, 1993; Charness and
Dufwenberg, 2006), only the voluntary payment will increase the frequency of truth-
ful advice, and this only in case that the payment is perceived as a kind gesture.
If both outcomes and intentions matter (see, e.g., Falk and Fischbacher, 2006; Falk
et al., 2008) and, again, if the payment is perceived as a kind gesture, then the
highest frequency of truthful advice will be induced by the voluntary payment,
followed by the obligatory payment, and the case where there is no payment at all.
11Lying aversion (see Hurkens and Kartik, 2009; Gneezy, 2005) may also play a role but not for
the comparison across treatments and conditions.
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but as a bribe or as an attempt to oblige the advisor to act against her own interest,
the voluntary payment will lead to even less truthful advice than no payment at all,
if advisors believe that clients will follow their advice.
In summary, selsh advisors will not be aected by the payment. Inequity averse
advisors will provide more truthful advice with payment (no matter whether obliga-
tory or voluntary) rather than without it. If advisors are positively reciprocal, only
the voluntary payment will increase the frequency of truthful advice. If advisors are
a mixture of inequity-averse, (positively) reciprocal, and both inequity-averse and
reciprocal individuals, both payments will increase the frequency of truthful advice,
with the voluntary payment being more eective. The data on beliefs will help to
distinguish between a truthful recommendation provided in the belief that it will
not be followed and a truly truthful one.
Whether clients will follow advice or not, depends on their beliefs about the nature
of advisors and how the payment will aect the recommendations.
3 Results
In reporting the results, I will proceed as follows. I will rst discuss the behavior
and beliefs of advisors. Then I will turn to the behavior and beliefs of clients.
3.1 Behavior of advisors
In all treatments the share of truthful advice is higher with payment than without
payment. However, in O2 the result fails to attain statistical signicance. Fig. 1
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Figure 1: Share of truthful advice conditional on payment
Table 4 provides the result of ve Logit regressions12, investigating the eect of
the payment on the probability of truthful advice being provided (the dependent
variable takes the value of 1 if the advisor provided a truthful recommendation and 0
otherwise). In all treatments the relationship between truthful advice and payment
is positive, but only in O1, V1, and V2 is it also signicant (see regressions I to IV).
Regression V shows the comparison across treatments. The V1-dummy is the only
one that signicantly diers from all other treatment dummies, meaning that the
probability of truthful advice, both given payment and given no payment, is lowest
in V1.13
12Because of the strategy method, each subject makes two decisions (besides clients in the V-
treatments) and states two beliefs. To account for the fact that subjects decide repeatedly, I ran
regressions with individual-specic random eects.
13Pairwise Wald tests were performed on the estimated coecients of regression V. The null
hypothesis of equality between coecients could only be rejected when comparing the coecient
of the dummy V1 with the coecients of the dummies O1 (p = 0:02), O2 (p = 0:09), and V2
(p = 0:04).
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Indep. var. O1 O2 V1 V2 All
Payment{dummy 1.39* 1.25 10.03*** 1.39* 1.51***









Constant -1.81** -2.28** -23.81*** -1.99**
(0.81) (0.92) (2.69) (0.84)
N 64 64 62 64 254
Log likelihood -37.77 -34.41 -17.97 -36.67 -129.07
Table 4: Truthful advice depending on payment and treatment
Note: Logit regressions with individual-specic random eects, standard errors in
parentheses, *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1
Result 1 : In all treatments but O2, the frequency of truthful advice is higher with
payment than without payment.
Result 2 : Across treatments O1, V1, and V2, the payment induces the lowest
frequency of truthful advice in V1.
Why is the frequency of truthful advice lower in V1 than in V2 for both conditions
(payment and no payment)? It seems that voluntary payments of any amount
provoke positively reciprocal responses. However, a small voluntary payment may
not be perceived as suciently generous. Trying to oblige someone to sacrice prots
in exchange for `peanuts' may not have an eect at all. On the other hand, refusing
to oer the `peanuts' also seems to be a bad idea. In contrast, not being prepared to
oer 80% of the show-up fee (i.e., the relatively high amount of 2 euros, compared
to the overall earnings in the experiment) seems more tolerable to advisors.
It is puzzling that the high obligatory payment does not have a positive eect on
15
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conclude that intentions behind the payment are needed in order to reduce moral
hazard. However, this explanation is not able to accommodate the fact that the
low obligatory payment does increase truthful advice. Looking at beliefs of advisors
may be helpful in understanding this puzzle.
3.2 Beliefs of advisors
Table 5 reports the average beliefs of advisors about the share of clients who will
follow advice conditional on payment.
Beliefs of advisors O1 O2 V1 V2
Follow with payment 49% 53% 74% 74%
Follow without payment 64% 57% 46% 49%
Table 5: Average beliefs of advisors about advice implementation conditional on
payment
Table 6 lists six regressions which show how beliefs of advisors regarding the behavior
of clients depend on the payment and intentions behind it. The rst four are done
for each treatment separately. In V1 and V2, the payment raises beliefs about advice
implementation. Surprisingly, in O1 the same relationship has a negative sign, and
in O2 the payment does not change beliefs at all.
Regressions V and VI compare the belief in advice implementation conditional on
no payment (V) and payment (VI) across treatments. It turns out that for both
conditions, beliefs in V1 do not dier from beliefs in V2, and beliefs in O1 do not
dier from beliefs in O2. Given payment, beliefs in the O{treatments are signi-
cantly lower than in the V{treatments.14 Given no payment, beliefs in O1 are higher
14Wald test p{values for all pairwise comparisons between the coecients of the V{dummies and
the O{dummies are highly signicant (< 0:001).
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V1 (p = 0:05) and the same as in V2. These results give a rst hint that intentions
behind the payment matter. In contrast to the obligatory payment, the voluntary
payment drives beliefs more toward the extremes: downward in absence of payment
and upward in presence of payment. Advisors in V1 (V2) guessed that 35% (40%)
of clients would pay for advice.
Dep. var.: Belief of AD I II III IV V VI
Indep. var. O1 O2 V1 V2 NP P
Payment{dummy -14.88*** -4.09 28.00*** 24.56***









Constant 64.28*** 57.41*** 46.29*** 49.09***
(3.59) (4.55) (3.68) (3.93)
N 64 64 62 64 127 127
Table 6: Beliefs of advisors that clients will follow advice dependent on payment
Note: Random eects regressions (I{IV) and OLS regressions (V, VI), standard errors in
parentheses, *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1, AD = Advisor, NP = No payment, P
= Payment
While the voluntary payment increases the advisors' beliefs about advice implemen-
tation and hence, according to advisors, the trust of clients in the quality of advice,
the obligatory payment seems to create confusion. According to advisors, the high
obligatory payment does not render advice more trustworthy than no payment at all.
This belief suits the behavior of advisors who provide the same amount of truth-
ful advice in both conditions. According to the behavior and beliefs of advisors,
one can already conclude that the combination of commissions for advisors and a
high obligatory payment by clients does not change behavior and beliefs of advisors,
compared to the case where only commissions are paid.
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ment than with a low obligatory payment. This nding resolves the puzzle men-
tioned in the previous section. Recall that it was dicult to explain why the large
obligatory payment is not able to increase truthful advice, while the small obligatory
payment is. The explanation is straightforward. Most advisors who provide truth-
ful recommendations, given the low obligatory payment, do not truly believe that
the latter will be followed. Hence, in this treatment we are dealing with strategic
agents who tell the truth but mean to deceive. Advisors believe that clients are
more likely to follow advice without payment, and in this situation, they readily
provide misleading recommendations. This means that the low obligatory payment
is an improper mechanism to reduce moral hazard of professional advisors.
Result 3 : The voluntary payments raise the belief of advisors in advice implemen-
tation compared to no payment at all. The large obligatory payment does not change
beliefs in advice implementation, and the small one decreases beliefs.
Result 4 : With payment, more clients are expected to follow advice in the V-
treatments than in the O-treatments. Without payment, the results are reversed.
Intentions related to the payment are believed to in
uence behavior.
Conclusion 1 : The obligatory payments are not appropriate for reducing the con-

ict of interest of advisors.
3.3 Behavior of clients
Although on average more truthful advice is expected with payment than without
payment in all treatments (see Table 8), only 45% of clients in V1 and only 13% in V2
oer a payment.15 One explanation for the observed behavior may be the relatively
15The dierence is signicant: one-tailed Fisher's exact test, p = 0:032.
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the high uncertainty about the possible earnings in the experiment.
Table 7 provides descriptives on the share of clients who follow advice conditional
on payment. In all treatments but O2, signicantly more clients follow advice with
payment than without payment.16
Treatment O1 O2 V1 V2
Clients follow with payment 21 (66%) 14 (44%) 11 (100%) 4 (100%)
Clients follow without payment 13 (41%) 17 (53%) 3 (15%) 7 (25%)
Table 7: Conditional behavior of clients
Notice that 100% of the clients who voluntarily paid for advice also follow it. This
percentage is signicantly lower in the O-treatments.17 At the same time, signi-
cantly more clients follow advice without payment in the O{treatments than in the
V{treatments.18
It seems that the driving force behind trust in advice is not related to the amount
paid but to the intention to make or withhold payment and to the belief about how
the advisor will react to that intention. Clients seem to believe that the voluntary
payment will ensure them good advice, while the refusal to oer it will render advi-
sors unwilling to provide truthful advice. The data on beliefs in the next section will
help evaluate these conjectures. In any case, in the V-treatments and in O2 clients
16Fisher's exact test, one-tailed: p = 0 for V1 and p = 0:009 for V2; McNemar's test, one-tailed:
p = 0:0325 for O1 and p = 0:6 for O2. The McNemar's test is used to compare dependent samples.
Because of the strategy method, in the O{treatments the same individual makes two decisions {
with and without payment. Hence, when comparing the sample \payment" with the sample \no
payment," we are dealing with two dependent samples.
17According to a one-tailed Fisher's exact test, V1 diers from O1 (p = 0:022) and O2 (p =
0:001), and V2 diers from O2 (p = 0:052).
18The rate of advice implementation without payment does not statistically dier between O1
and O2, and V1 and V2. However, V1 diers from both O1 and O2 (p = 0:048 and p = 0:006,
respectively), and V2 diers from both O1 and O2 (p = 0:081 and p = 0:025 respectively), one-
tailed Fisher's exact test.
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the payment increases advice implementation and in O2 the payment does not have
an eect. The beliefs of advisors are wrong with respect to behavior in O1.
Result 5 : In all treatments but O2, more clients follow advice with payment than
without it.
Result 6 : Given payment (no payment), the share of implemented advice is higher
in the V-treatments (O-treatments) than in the O-treatments (V-treatments).
3.4 Beliefs of clients
Table 8 presents the average beliefs for each condition by treatment. Table 9 shows
the results of six regressions explaining how beliefs depend on the payment (regres-
sions I to IV) and how beliefs dier across treatments holding the condition constant
(V, VI). The positive and signicant Payment{dummy in regressions I to IV indi-
cate that in all treatments clients expect more truthful advice with payment than
without it.
Beliefs of clients O1 O2 V1 V2
Truthful advice with payment 59% 61% 63% 68%
Truthful advice without payment 39% 47% 34% 29%
Table 8: Average beliefs of clients about the share of truthful advice conditional on
payment
Given payment (see Table 8), clients in V2 are most condent about the loyalty of
their advisors, followed by clients in V1, O2, and O1, with none of these dierences
being signicant. However, this order of treatments hints at the fact that both in-
tentions and the amount paid matter, with intentions being more important. Given
no payment, clients in V2 are the most skeptical ones now, followed by clients in V1,
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(see Tables 8 and 9).19 In accordance with the conjectures about behavior in the last
section, not agreeing to pay voluntarily is expected to have negative consequences. If
intentions are present (as in the V-treatments), the consequences of no payment are
expected to be more severe, compared to the case where no intentions are present,
and hence the client cannot be blamed for having refused a payment. The higher
the deliberately refused payment, the greater the skepticism. It is interesting that
beliefs of clients in the O-treatments coincide with behavior more closely than in
the V-treatments.
Dep. var.: Beliefs of CL I II III IV V VI
Indep. var. O1 O2 V1 V2 NP P
Payment{dummy 20.06*** 14.22** 28.39*** 38.63***









Constant 38.66*** 46.84*** 34.29*** 29.06***
(3.71) (4.3) (4.67) (4.46)
N 64 64 62 64 127 127
Table 9: Beliefs of clients about the frequency of truthful advice
Note: Random eects regressions (I{IV) and OLS regressions (V, VI), CL = client, P =
Payment, NP = No payment, standard errors in parentheses,
*** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1
Result 7 : Clients expect more truthful advice with payment than without it.
Result 8 : Without payment, clients expect signicantly less truthful advice in the
V-treatments than in the O-treatments. Refusing to make a voluntary oer is ex-
pected to have negative consequences. Intentions seem to matter.
19The Wald tests performed on the estimated coecients of regression V (see Table 9) yield:
p = 0:0371 for V1 versus O2, and p = 0:0032 for V2 versus O2.
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more truthful advice with payment than without payment and truly believe that
clients will follow this advice. With a small obligatory payment, advisors provide
truthful advice but mean to deceive, while the large obligatory payment does not
change their behavior and beliefs, compared to no payment at all. Clients expect
more truthful advice with payment in all treatments and follow advice more often
with payment than without it in all treatments but O2.
Only in the V{treatments are the behavior and beliefs of clients and advisors aligned.
The payment in V2 induces higher frequencies of truthful advice than in V1, every-
thing else being the same. Hence:
Conclusion 2 : The large voluntary payment by clients is the most successful mech-
anism for reducing the con
ict of interest of advisors.
Advisors Clients
Treatment Truthful advice Beliefs of AD Follow Beliefs of CL
O1 P>NP P<NP P>NP P>NP
O2 P=NP P=NP P=NP P>NP
V1 P>NP P>NP P>NP P>NP
V2 P>NP P>NP P>NP P>NP
Table 10: Summary of results
Note: AD = Advisor, CL = Client, P = Payment, NP = No payment
4 Conclusions
This study was inspired by an ongoing debate pointing at failures on the market for
nancial consulting. Commissions paid by the suppliers of nancial products may
lead advisors to recommend not the products that are best for their clients but those
that yield the highest commissions to themselves. The current study tests whether
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as alternative remuneration modes reduces the con
ict of interest of advisors and
thereby induce more truthful advice.
The laboratory environment gives an excellent opportunity to isolate and compare
the dierent remuneration modes. With a simple task at hand, the intention of
advisors to deceive can be clearly separated from their lack of competence. This
is not possible in the eld. Furthermore, since the experimental setting provides
access to the beliefs of advisors about the behavior of clients, one can easily check
whether advice that appears truthful really is.
The experiment has intentionally implemented the most unfavorable scenario for the
main hypothesis { that an additional payment will decrease the con
ict of interest
faced by advisors. The experimental situation is a one-shot, anonymous interaction
between strangers, without the threat of immediate or future punishment (since
reputation formation is excluded), and peer pressure (since the client never learns
whether advice was truthful). Advisors who do not suer from lying aversion and
believe that clients are likely to follow advice, do not have any reason to provide a
truthful recommendation except when they feel obliged to reciprocate with a kind
gesture (i.e., given a voluntary payment) or reduce inequality (i.e., given a voluntary
or obligatory payment).
The results indicate that only the voluntary payments succeed in reducing the con-

ict of interest of advisors. The large obligatory payment does not have any eect
on the share of truthful advice; the small obligatory payment increases the share of
truthful advice in comparison to no payment at all, but only because advisors actu-
ally believe that clients are not likely to follow advice, i.e., truthful advice is meant
to deceive. The voluntary payments, on the contrary, do not only increase the share
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and advice implementation. Further, the large voluntary payment is more eective
than the small one. Obviously, fair outcomes alone (equalization of payos) are not
sucient to reduce moral hazard { intentions are also needed. Once intentions are
there, outcomes start to matter again. Consequently, both intentions and outcomes
matter for reducing moral hazard, with intentions being more important.
Surely, insights based on one experiment only have to be taken with caution. Never-
theless, one can already identify an important tendency. The serious moral hazard
problem on the market for nancial advice can be reduced by introducing a voluntary
payment by clients.
Future research may aim at modeling the situation more realistically by allowing
competition among advisors and reputation formation. Both can be expected to
create additional incentives for advisors (besides reciprocity and inequity aversion)
to provide truthful recommendations. Further, a payo asymmetry could be intro-
duced to account for the fact that a loss to an advisor is less serious than a loss to
a client. Endowing clients with partial information on payos would accommodate
the possibility that clients may be well-informed or that even completely uninformed
clients may take advantage of easily accessible information sources like the Internet.
It may also be worthwhile to compare a voluntary payment made before the con-
sulting activity with a voluntary payment made after the consulting activity, i.e. a
bonus in the spirit of Fehr et al. (2007), or with a punishment by the client as in
Fehr et al. (1997).
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5 Appendix
5.1 A (non-exhaustive) list of references to German news-
paper articles
\Gute Beratung gibt es nicht umsonst," Welt am Sonntag, June 2003;
\Guter Rat ist billig", Die Zeit, August 2006;
\Was gute professionelle Hilfe ausmacht," Financial Times Deutschland, November
2007;
\Honorarberatung auf dem Vormarsch," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, July 2009;
\Die Vorz uge der Honorarberatung", F.A.Z., July 2009.
5.2 Instructions
The text placed in square brackets is relevant for the V-treatments only. The text
in round brackets concerns the O-treatments. Curly brackets distinguish between
a payment of one and two euros. Since in the original instructions the notions
\advisor" and \decision maker" were used, the translation also uses \decision maker"
rather than \client."
Instructions for Advisors
Welcome to the experiment! Please switch o your cell phones, stop communi-
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these instructions. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. One of the
experimenters will come to your place and answer your questions in private.
In this experiment you will interact with one other participant just once. After that,
the experiment will end and you will be paid in cash. The other participant will be
assigned to you at random. None of you will get to know the identity of the other.
There are two roles: advisor and decision maker. You are randomly assigned the
role of advisor.
There are three possible options. Every option consists of a payo each for you and
the decision maker in your pair. Here are the three options:
Option A: You receive 10 euros and the decision maker receives 5 euros.
Option B: You receive 5 euros and the decision maker receives 10 euros.
Option C: You receive 3 euros and the decision maker receives 3 euros.
The task of the decision maker is to choose one of these options. The decision maker
knows that there are three options. However, the decision maker does not know the
payos related to each option. Your recommendation will be the only information
that the decision maker will have about the dierent options. Your task is to make
one of the following recommendations to the decision maker :
Recommendation 1: Option A will earn you more money than the other two options.
Recommendation 2: Option B will earn you more money than the other two options.
Recommendation 3: Option C will earn you more money than the other two options.
Rather than showing your recommendation to the decision maker, we will ask her
whether she wants to follow it. If yes, the recommended option will be implemented
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were not recommended and implement it. The selected option will determine the
nal payos for both of you. Additionally, both of you will receive a show-up fee of
2.5 euros.
[Before you make your recommendation, the decision maker can voluntarily oer
you 1 euro f2 eurosg for your recommendation. This 1 euro fThese 2 eurosg will be
subtracted from her show-up fee and added to your show-up fee. You are obliged
to make a recommendation, even if the decision maker does not oer you anything.
At this point, we will not inform you whether the decision maker oered you 1 euro
f2 eurosg. You will make a decision for the case in which the decision maker oered
you 1 euro f2 eurosg and for the case in which the decision maker did not oer
you 1 euro f2 eurosg. If the recommendations dier from each other, the decision
maker will receive the recommendation which corresponds to her actual decision.
Example: You want to make Recommendation 3 if the decision maker oers you
1 euro f2 eurosg and Recommendation 2 if the decision maker does not oer you
anything. Actually, the decision maker decided to oer you 1 euro f2 eurosg. Hence,
the decision maker receives Recommendation 3.]
(It will be randomly determined whether the decision maker has to pay you 1 euro
or 0 euros f2 euros or 0 eurosg for your recommendation. If the decision maker has
to pay 1 euro f2 eurosg, 1 euro f2 eurosg will be subtracted from her show-up fee
and added to your show-up fee.
At rst, neither of you will be informed which situation was randomly selected. You
will make a recommendation to the decision maker for the case in which she has to
pay and for the case in which she does not have to pay. The recommendations can
be dierent, but they need not be. For each situation, the decision maker will state
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experiment will you and the decision maker learn whether the decision maker had
to pay. Your own payo and the payo of the decision maker will be determined
by the decisions that were made for this situation. Example: the advisor makes
Recommendation 3 if the decision maker has to pay and Recommendation 2 if the
decision maker does not have to pay. At the same time (i.e., without seeing exactly
which option was recommended), the decision maker must state whether she wants
to follow the recommendation, if she has to pay for it, and whether she wants to
follow the recommendation, if she does not have to pay for it. The decision maker
states twice that she wants to follow it. The randomly selected situation is: decision
maker has to pay. Consequently, the relevant decisions are \Recommendation 3"
and \Follow." This means that Option C is implemented.)
At the end of the experiment, the decision maker will learn only her own payo
from the selected option. This means, the decision maker will never learn what
payos she would have earned from the other two not selected options. Moreover,
the decision maker will never learn your payos from the three options.
Before we inform you about your nal payo, we will ask you to answer some
questions on your computer screen. In doing so, you can earn additional money.
How exactly, you will learn from your screen later on.
After you have learned your nal payo, we will ask you to ll in a short question-
naire.
Next, you will be asked to answer some questions on your screen which will help
you to better understand these instructions.
Do you have any questions regarding these instructions? If so, please raise your
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Instructions for decision makers
Welcome to the experiment! Please switch o your cell phones, stop communi-
cating with other participants, and remove all objects from your desk except for
these instructions. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. One of the
experimenters will come to your place and answer your questions in private.
In this experiment you will interact with one other participant just once. After that,
the experiment will end and you will be paid in cash. The other participant will be
assigned to you at random. None of you will get to know the identity of the other.
There are two roles: advisor and decision maker. You were randomly assigned the
role of the decision maker.
There are three possible options. Every option consists of a payo each for you
and the decision maker in your pair. For example: \Option A: the advisor receives
... euros and the decision maker receives ... euros." We showed the three options
with the corresponding payos to the advisor. Her recommendation will be the
only information that you will receive about the dierent options. There are three
possible recommendations:
Recommendation 1: Option A will earn you more money than the other two options.
Recommendation 2: Option B will earn you more money than the other two options.
Recommendation 3: Option C will earn you more money than the other two options.
Your task is to select one of the options. You will not see the recommendation of
the advisor, but you have to decide whether you want to follow it or not. If yes, the
recommended option will be implemented as your decision. If no, the computer will
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The selected option will determine the nal payos for both of you. Additionally,
both of you will receive a show-up fee of 2.5 euros.
At the end of the experiment, you will learn only your own payo from the selected
option. This means, you will never learn what payos you would have earned from
the other two not selected options. Moreover, you will never learn the advisor's
payos from the three options.
[Before the advisor makes her recommendation, you have to decide whether you
want to voluntarily oer her 1 euro f2 eurosg for her recommendation. The 1 euro
f2 eurosg will be subtracted from your show-up fee and added to the show-up fee
of the advisor. The advisor is obliged to give you a recommendation in any case,
even if you do not oer her anything. At this point, we will not inform the advisor
whether you oered her 1 euro f2 eurosg. She will make a decision for the case in
which you oered her 1 euro f2 eurosg and for the case in which you did not oer
her 1 euro f2 eurosg. If the recommendations dier from each other, you will receive
the recommendation that corresponds to your actual decision to oer the voluntary
payment or not.]
(It will be randomly determined whether you have to pay 1 euro or 0 euros
f2 euros or 0 eurosg for the recommendation. If you have to pay 1 euro f2 eurosg, 1
euro f2 eurosg will be subtracted from your show-up fee and added to the show-up
fee of the advisor.
At rst, neither of you will be informed which situation was randomly selected.
The advisor will give you a recommendation for the case in which you have to pay
and for the case in which you do not have to pay. The recommendations can be
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want to follow the recommendation or not. Only at the end of the experiment will
you and the advisor learn whether you had to pay. Your own payo and that of
the advisor will be determined by the decisions that were made for this situation.
Example: the advisor makes Recommendation 3 if the decision maker has to pay and
Recommendation 2 if the decision maker does not have to pay. At the same time
(i.e., without exactly seeing which option was recommended), the decision maker
must state whether she wants to follow the recommendation if she has to pay for
it and whether she wants to follow the recommendation if she does not have to pay
for it. The decision maker states twice that she wants to follow it. The randomly
selected situation is: decision maker has to pay. Consequently, the relevant decisions
are \Recommendation 3" and \Follow." This means that Option C is implemented.)
Before we inform you about your nal payo, we will ask you to answer some
questions on your computer screen. In doing so, you can earn additional money.
How exactly, you will learn from your screen later on.
After you have learned your nal payo, we will ask you to ll in a short question-
naire.
Next, you will be asked to answer some questions on your screen which will help
you to better understand these instructions.
Do you have any questions regarding these instructions? If so, please raise your
hand. Otherwise, please click on \continue."
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